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I consider if and how far it is possible to live an educational philosophical life, in the 
fast changing, globalised world of Higher Education. I begin with Socrates’ account 
of a philosophical life in the Apology. I examine some tensions within different 
conceptions of what it is to do philosophy. Then I go on to focus more closely on 
what it might be to live a philosophical, educational life in which educational 
processes and outcomes are influenced by philosophy, using examples taken from 
published sources and from conversational interviews with philosophers carried out 
by myself with Kenneth Wain, Bas Levering and Richard Pring.  I then outline the 
directions of current European policy for Higher Education. Finally I discuss how far 
current policies and trends leave room for doing philosophy of education, concluding 
that it is possible, but only for individuals who are in very much in sympathy with 
current policy trends or who are creative in constructing smoke screens.  
 
Key words: 
Educational life; philosophical life; philosophical pedagogy; research assessment; 
quality assessment; educational policy; Higher Education.
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Is it possible to live a philosophical, educational life in education, nowadays? 
 
1.  Being a philosopher of education 
To understand education necessitates understanding a complex interaction of 
practices, theories, ethics and politics. To be an educator is to do something: to 
undertake a practical activity with a view to making a difference.  The kinds of 
differences that educators make can never be epistemologically, ethically or 
politically neutral. So such practical activities are complex, and always ethical and 
political. I use the term ‘educators’ rather than ‘teachers’ because the former has a 
broader signification. It includes school teachers. It also includes tutors in adult and 
community education, pre-school staff, policy makers, administrators and university 
lecturers.  
 
It is possible to be an educator without paying attention to explicit theories of 
education, or to the reasons behind policy changes which affect practice. Indeed some 
educators prefer to see education as a severely practical activity, without need of 
complex theorisation.  However when educators take this view they severely curtail 
their understanding of their own practices and so their capacity for reflection and 
examination of what they are doing. They miss the opportunity to engage with 
research and explicit theory in order to improve what they do. They also miss the 
opportunity of making their own implicit theories explicit in order to bring them into 
articulation with a diversity of perspectives based on practice, research and 
scholarship.  
 
Those whose roles mean they spend a considerable proportion of their time 
researching and theorising education are often engaged in educational practices 
themselves, as university teachers, policy makers or consultants.  Clearly there are 
logical links within a role which combines theorising education and practicing it, even 
if some theorists do not make this connection.  Just as with educators who see their 
work as severely practical, those who see their theoretical work as disconnected from 
their own practices miss the opportunity to reflect on and examine what they are 
doing as educational professionals. For educational theorists, epistemological, ethical 
and political reflexivity about their own professional lives is relevant to their research 
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as well as to their educational practices.  They are called on to live their conclusions 
and understandings in a way that few other areas of scholarship share.  
 
In short, educators live educational lives. They have responsibility for what they are 
doing, regardless of whether they are among those who are primarily engaged in 
practice or among those who are primarily engaged in theorising. This means that 
they cannot escape the significance of ethical and political reflexivity. 
 
The focus in this paper is on one subset of educators for whom there is a further 
complexity: philosophers of education. Philosophy itself may be understood to be a 
responsible practice as well as a theoretical pursuit. Thus to be a philosopher can be 
understood as living a philosophical life, just as being an educator is to live an 
educational life. Both kinds of lives are self-constructed. There can be no universal, 
timeless meaning for either of the phrases, ‘living a philosophical life’ and ‘living an 
educational life’. Their meanings are contingent on the historical, geographical, 
personal, social and cultural circumstances in which that life is being lived. To 
paraphrase Marx, philosophers of education live philosophical, educational lives, but 
not in circumstances of their own making.  
 
In this paper I consider how far and in what ways it is possible to live a philosophical, 
educational life, nowadays. I will not be arguing that philosophers of education ought 
to ‘practice what we preach’ (though I think we should) because to argue that ethical 
position is well beyond the scope of this paper.  In the next Section, I consider some 
answers to the question of what it is to live a philosophical life, starting with the 
Socrates of Plato’s Apology who claims to have spent most of his life living what he 
saw as a philosophical life, attempting to influence the political life of Athens, rather 
than taking part in public life directly. In Section 3, I focus on what it might be to live 
a philosophical, educational life in which educational processes and outcomes are 
influenced by philosophy. However I do not consider other aspects of what it is to live 
an educational life, and the many possible interpretations of that phrase. I use 
examples taken from published sources and from conversational interviews I have 
carried out with some philosophers of education.  In Section 4, I discuss the 
implications of current policy, since the hope of being able to live a philosophical, 
educational life is constrained by policy. I outline the current world-wide tendency 
 4 
among policy makers to embrace a view of education as having clear objectives and 
specifiable outcomes and which is primarily concerned with being useful for the 
State, especially in economic terms. I briefly discuss what kind of philosophy of 
education fits well with current policy contexts, focusing first on pedagogy and 
secondly on policy. I point out that few philosophers of education would wish to 
embrace such a conception. Finally, I consider if current policies and trends within 
education leave room for these alternative conceptions. So I return to the issue at the 
heart of the Apology: Is it possible to live a philosophical, educational life nowadays?  
 
2. What is it to ‘live a philosophical life’?  
 
What is it to live a philosophical life? Socrates gave an answer in his speech to the 
City during his trial for corrupting the young and teaching them to not believe in the 
gods.  Plato reports his speech in the Apology.
1
  For Socrates, a philosopher is a lover 
of wisdom, who should not only try to know what wisdom is, but also to pursue it 
through talking. Such talk is a dialogue from which both parties hope to learn. A 
philosopher also has to try to persuade others to value wisdom (Apology 29d). 
Moreover, philosophy is not just a matter of theorising and conversing with 
individuals about virtue, but also of the public good more generally, the good of the 
city (36d). He was clear that living the philosophical life included the doing of 
philosophy through talk: a commitment to debate and to the deep concern for the 
good of the polity and the individuals within it. He was keen to point out that he was 
willing to debate with any and everybody, not just with those willing to pay (33a). It 
was arguable that he wanted to distinguish ‘sophists’ who earned money from 
teaching their claimed superior wisdom, in contrast to ‘philosophers’ who loved and 
sought wisdom. For Socrates, the commitment to seeking virtue could not be 
separated from the practice of philosophy.  
Socrates’ speech about the nature of a philosophical life remains influential. However, 
people have been doing philosophy for over two and a half thousand years since 
Socrates’ time. Even a glance at that history shows that there is very little agreement 
about what philosophy itself is. Philosophy may still be characterised as the love of 
wisdom – but such a statement begs the questions of what counts as love, as wisdom, 
and, of course, promising ways of expressing or acting on such a love.   
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Socrates’ view about the philosophical life has held up well. In the early twentieth 
century Dewey (1916) argued that since philosophy is a love of wisdom, it holds 
implications for the conduct of life. He still needed to argue the point because any one 
view about the nature of philosophy is bound to be contentious.  Indeed, the question 
‘What is philosophy?’ is itself a philosophical question. One often quoted remark 
(attributed to various philosophers) is that philosophy is what is found on the 
bookshelf in a philosopher’s study.  However, this remark is less than helpful because 
it gives no insight into the passionate arguments philosophers have about what 
content and method properly features in philosophical writing and debate. Examples 
abound from the second half of the twentieth century. Witness the debates about 
whether feminist philosophy could properly be called philosophy. It was argued 
strongly that philosophy could have no gender, for instance, as reported in an 
educational context by Jane Roland Martin (1994). Witness also the furore sparked in 
the early 1990s by the initial refusal of the Philosophy Faculty at Cambridge 
university to give Derrida an honorary degree because they found his work lacked 
academic rigour. This was just one example of rifts between the Anglo-Saxon, 
analytic tradition and so-called ‘continental’ philosophy, rifts that dominated 
philosophy in the second half of the 20
th
 century. Within philosophy of education, 
evidence for such a rift and differing perceptions of it can be found in the exchange 
between Standish (2007) and White (2010).  
 
Plato seems to have taken rather a different view from Socrates, and he too has been 
hugely influential. A well known characterisation of philosophy is Whitehead’s 
famous comment: 
The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is 
that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. (1979, p.39) 
Not he hastens to add, though this is less often quoted, that such footnoting entails 
adopting Plato’s own system. On the contrary he says: 
I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have 
doubtfully extracted from his writings. I allude to the wealth of general ideas 
scattered through them. (1979, p.39) 
True to Whitehead’s observation, Plato’s often quoted comment2, ‘For wonder is the 
feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder’, is itself taken as a general 
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idea rather than a specific one. In context, wonder is seen as the attribute of a diligent 
beginner learning from, rather than with, a master. The context is one of dialogue but 
one in which there is an interlocutor who is speaking from a position of greater 
knowledge rather than one which is a joint search between two people who both stand 
to learn from the conversation, still less one in which everyone can benefit (Theatatus, 
155d):   
Soc.  For I suspect that you have thought of these questions before now. 
Theaet.  Yes, Socrates, and I am amazed when I think of them; … 
Soc.  I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a true insight into 
your nature when he said that you were a philosopher, for wonder 
is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder. 
But do you begin to see what is the explanation of this 
perplexity…? 
Theaet.  Not as yet.  
Soc.  Then you will be obliged to me if I help you to unearth the hidden 
"truth" of a famous man or school.  
Theaet.  To be sure, I shall be very much obliged.  
Soc.  Take a look round, then, and see that none of the uninitiated are 
listening. Now by the uninitiated I mean: the people who believe in 
nothing but what they can grasp in their hands, and who will not 
allow that action or generation or anything invisible can have real 
existence.  
Theaet.  Yes, indeed, Socrates, they are very hard and impenetrable 
mortals.  
Soc.  Yes, my boy, outer barbarians. Far more ingenious are the brethren 
whose mysteries I am about to reveal to you.   
 
Aristotle can be said to have begun this process of footnoting to Plato using general 
ideas rather than specific ones. His idea of wonder seems to be far more related to 
puzzlement, and indeed to facts yet to be discovered rather than to mathematical or 
logical ideas. This leaves Aristotle as far from Socrates’ concern with individual and 
collective virtue to be continually sought in dialogue with anyone willing to engage in 
it as he is from Plato, his own teacher.  
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Different answers to the question, ‘What is philosophy?’ seem to reflect a number of 
continuing tensions within philosophy and philosophising. These are the kinds of 
tensions that can already be seen in Plato as he moves away from Socrates, but 
continues to be influenced by him. They can then be seen again in Aristotle as he in 
turn moves away from Plato but continues to be influenced by him. The term 
‘tensions’ is used because they are precisely that: tensions. That is, they exist because 
there is more than one force. So they are not either/or positions. They are better 
understood as positions in the force fields. Such positions are analogous to, for 
instance, the position of a weight on a spring which responds to the force of gravity 
and also to the force of  the spring.  And there are usually more than two forces, for 
instance if someone pulls on the weight. Similarly the alignment of iron filings in a 
magnetic field depends on the existence of at least one North and one South pole, but 
is affected by any other magnetic material in the vicinity.  
 
In what follows I draw attention to some of these tensions, especially the ones that 
have a particular bearing on what it is to do philosophy of education. I consider: 
engagement and contemplation; process and product; reasons in words, stories and 
images; the true, the good and the new. I will argue that to do philosophy necessitates 
the philosopher resolving these tensions and dilemmas, if only provisionally.  And 
these resolutions result in a particular interpretation of what it might mean to live a 
philosophical life - in particular, to live a philosophical, educational life. My 
argument is not intended as an exhaustive analysis of tensions that arise within the 
understanding of what philosophy is. For instance I consider neither the role of 
tradition nor political stance. Equally, I barely consider tensions that arise within an 
understanding of educational practices.
3
 A full discussion would be beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
 
A tension which is particularly significant for educators is related to the extent to 
which philosophy is taken to be something which springs from and engages with the 
everyday world. Philosophers differ in how far they take what they do to be 
something which is intended to make a difference to that world and how far they take 
it to be a contemplation of it. Plainly, educational philosophers are less likely to 
position themselves close to the contemplation end of this tension. I am of the view 
that research and scholarship carried out as ‘educational’ is intended to make a 
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difference. Of course it may be that it is carried out about education without being 
‘educational’ (Griffiths, 1998). Research and scholarship about education may be 
carried out without any intention of making a practical difference, but be done, 
perhaps, out of curiosity, or from the joy of understanding the logic of some area of it.  
Simone Weil is an example of a philosopher who felt the force of both engagement 
and contemplation, while mostly working with a resolution in terms of the former. 
She says: 
The proper method of philosophy consists in clearly conceiving the insoluble 
problems in all their insolubility and then in simply contemplating them, 
fixedly and tirelessly, year after year, without any hope, patiently waiting. 
(Quoted in Cameron 2003, p.250) 
This remark is significant because Weil put her own health and security at risk in 
order to engage politically in education as a philosopher/teacher, and again later as a 
manual worker.  Philosophising was an integral part of her activism (Weil, 2005).  
 
Another significant tension is between philosophy as process and as product. I use the 
terms, ‘process’ and ‘product’ to emphasise the link with education and educational 
theory and practices, where these terms are often used to distinguish different 
understandings of the curriculum. They are not the terms popular in current 
mainstream philosophical writing where it is more usual to talk of 'methods’ and 
‘systems’. Some descriptions emphasise product:  the kinds of understanding that 
philosophy engenders and the systems it has developed in order to do so. Other 
descriptions of philosophy emphasise process: that to learn and understand 
philosophy necessarily implies doing it, and further, that the method of doing of it just 
is the philosophy. 
 
The resolution towards product or process is related to the resolution of the tension 
between engagement and contemplation.  If the resolution is towards process 
(method), tensions arise about what might count as a dialogue and a rational 
argument. Differences occur about the role of imagery in argument, as pointed out by 
Le Doeuff (1989). The nature of rationality itself is also in question. Lloyd (1984) is 
one of many examples of philosophers raising general issues about currently accepted 
criteria for rational discussion and argument. If the resolution is towards product 
(system), the wished for outcome of philosophy may be a better characterisation of 
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the true or the good. Arguably, in an educational context, this is what R.S. Peters took 
himself to be doing in relation to educational concepts. Alternatively, it may be 
something more creative. Deleuze and Guattari’s answer to the question, ‘What is 
philosophy?’, is that philosophers are engaged in the creation or formation of 
concepts (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994). According to this resolution, great 
philosophers are those who create fertile, explanatory concepts.  
 
Heidegger, Arendt and Jaspers are three philosophers whose philosophies were 
formed in relation to each other and they provide an interesting example of different 
ways of resolving these tensions. Heidegger developed systems of thought while also 
teaching and taking the post of rector of his university. The degree to which his 
philosophy is embedded in its Nazi context is a continuing subject of debate, but he 
never claimed that his philosophy was concerned with politics. Jaspers, on the other 
hand, thought it more important to teach and to engage politically, rather than to 
create a philosophical system. Arendt’s resolution in The Human Condition (Arendt, 
1958) was to create a system which was embedded in the world, but to call it 
‘political theory’ rather than philosophy. Philosophy proper, she thought was more 
abstract
4
. However, others generally take her to be doing philosophy in her more 
political as well as in what she, herself, considered to be her philosophical writing.  
 
So far the discussion has mainly focused on philosophy in general but my interest in this 
paper is philosophy of education. Education has been of interest to philosophers through 
the centuries. Their different approaches demonstrate how differently they have resolved 
the tensions inherent in answers to the question of what philosophy is. Hogan argues that 
Plato and Socrates differ on the specific question of teaching. Hogan argues that the 
historical Socrates, as found in the dialogues generally believed to be early, had a view of 
teaching which was coherent with his view of philosophy as a collaborative search for 
wisdom or truth. Hogan argues that for Socrates, teaching and learning are a process, a 
philosophical way of life based on dialogue. He then goes on to argue that Plato had a very 
different view of teaching, as found for instance in the opening sections of the Republic, or 
in the quotation from the Theatatus, above. In Plato can be found a conviction that the best 
teachers have the best grasp on truth and should tailor the students’ experiences and 
direction of argument accordingly. This view can also be attributed to Rousseau, in relation 
to the education of both boys and girls. Both are required to follow the strictures of their 
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teachers. A boy is required to learn from nature and not allowed to read anything except 
Robinson Crusoe until he attains puberty in case he learns anything second hand. A girl is 
required to become accustomed to restraint, since the teacher, her mother, knows that she 
needs to be docile as an adult woman. It seems that both Plato and Rousseau required 
education to fit into their more general systems of political philosophy – the kinds of men 
and women needed for their ideal polities. These three philosophers seem to resolve the 
tension about what counts as philosophical discussion and argument in different ways. 
Socrates appears to favour short, spoken questions and answers, explicitly so in the 
Protagoras.  Plato wrote dialogues. Rousseau wrote a story about two imaginary pupils, 
Emile and Sophie.   
Differences continue to fuel debates about how to resolve the tensions underlying the 
question about how best to characterise philosophy of education. Since the 1950s, 
philosophical writing on education has largely become the separate sub-discipline, 
‘philosophy of education’, with its institutional home in Faculties of Education rather than 
in Faculties of Philosophy, both in Britain and in the USA (Chambliss, 2009; Oancea and 
Bridges, 2009). Recent collections of papers show that within the English language 
tradition at least, there is little agreement about what should count as philosophy of 
education, and the diversity within the field  is commented on in the introductory sections 
of recent overviews of the field (Blake, Smeyers, Smith and Standish, 2003; Carr, 2005; 
Curren, 2006). At least part of this diversity is attributable to different ways of resolving 
tensions between contemplation, engagement, process, product, truth and rationality. For 
instance, in Blake et al. (2003), Hogan and Smith argue for philosophy of education as a 
practice, while in contrast, Noddings and Slote explain systems of ethics and apply them to 
education.. 
 
As I am doing philosophy of education myself, I shall place myself along the different 
dimensions, at least provisionally. I do this, reflexively, because how I do so must 
influence my understanding and presentation of philosophy of education. I align myself 
with engaged, dialogic, process-oriented approaches, always embedded in some specific 
context. For me, doing educational philosophy necessitates always asking the question, 
‘So what?’; and looking for an answer in relation to educational theory and practice 
beyond philosophy. However it is rarely something to be straightforwardly applied. It is 
less about producing a series of outcomes and more a way of understanding, of being in 
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the world. For instance it includes awareness of some relevant logical and conceptual 
distinctions and also a willingness to continue looking at their fit with current educational 
contexts.  This is what I have called elsewhere a ‘practical philosophy’ (1998; Barr and 
Griffiths, 2007; Leicester, Twelvetrees and Bowbrick, 2007). 
   
3. Examples of living a philosophical, educational life   
The philosophical, educational life in education will include writing for and/or debating 
with other philosophers and educators, in particular, educational philosophers. But it will 
also include activities intended to make a difference. These may include specifically 
pedagogical activities, especially teaching students on accredited courses. And they may 
include attempts to influence policy and/or public opinion about education in various 
ways. In this section I look at some examples from Europe and North America, to see 
how understandings of philosophy of education have been expressed in educational, 
philosophical lives in the not too distant past, both through teaching and through attempts 
to influence educational policy. 
 
3a.      Pedagogy 
There seem to be very few accounts in the educational literature about the connections 
between philosophical and pedagogical practice. The connection between a particular 
way of doing philosophy and a particular way of teaching are rarely made explicit, at 
least in writing. There is, of course, an extensive literature on what philosophical 
conclusions might mean for pedagogy. Most of this literature is not focused on the 
contexts in which philosophers themselves teach. A great deal of it focuses on 
schools. Some of it focuses on higher education including teacher education. But 
there seems to be very little published material about what a philosophical, 
educational approach might be when embodied and enacted. This seems to be so both 
for philosophers of education and also for philosophers in Departments of Philosophy.  
 
Campbell (2002) provides an interesting insight into how mainstream philosophers in 
North America have viewed the relationship between philosophy and pedagogy. In 
his article on the history of the teaching of philosophy in America since the late 
nineteenth century he shows that while some philosophers have seen links between 
doing and teaching philosophy, others think that the latter gets in the way of the 
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former. He describes how the American Philosophical Association (APA) was 
founded in 1901 because those supportive of it: 
were rebelling in part against the felt inadequacies of their own undergraduate 
educations.... instead of ‘real’ philosophical questioning, these philosophers 
felt that they had been offered a kind of apologetics for religious and political 
conservatism. (Campbell, 2002, p.54) 
He goes on to explain that at the same time that the APA was being founded, research 
universities  were being set up. These research universities saw their primary teaching 
focus to be graduates, but also considered that time spent teaching was time away 
from high quality scientific inquiry, including in philosophy. Currently, there is some 
interest among a few philosophers in how to teach, but there is little sign that this is 
related to their philosophical lives. This is demonstrated by most material published in 
the journal Teaching Philosophy (published since 1975) and in the blog  In Socrates’ 
Wake (on the web since 2007). The listserv PHILOS-L also regularly discusses 
teaching. However all of these publications appear to assume a consensus about what 
needs to be learnt and how. The suggestions, comments and questions are 
overwhelmingly technical, focusing on immediate questions about pedagogical 
strategies rather than on the educational or philosophical reasons behind them. 
Similarly, there is very little on the teaching of philosophy of education, though it is 
possible to find philosophically informed articles about introducing initial and in-
service teachers to theory in general (e.g. Dewhurst and Lamb, 2005). 
 
A possible source of information about philosophical, educational approaches can be 
found in biographical material. Michael Peters (2001) has explored the connections to 
be found between Wittgenstein the philosopher and Wittgenstein the teacher. Peters 
argues that Wittgenstein’s dialogic style in the Investigations can be seen as both his 
philosophy and his pedagogy. Similarly, Burbules (2008) argues that Wittgenstein 
was, consciously or not, modelling how to do philosophy in both his writing and his 
teaching.  Another philosopher who seems to have lived a philosophical, educational 
life is Geoff Midgley as reported by Mary Midgley (2005). She makes it clear that he 
saw both philosophising and teaching as engaged, serious, oral processes of dialogue 
rather than doing philosophy in the pages of Journals and teaching it didactically.  
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Published material from philosophers of education is equally rare, except, arguably, in 
relation to Philosophy for Children. An exception is a chapter by Hogan and Smith 
(2003). They argue that if philosophy is seen as the ‘under-labourer’ clearing the 
ground, as the 1960s London school tended to argue, then a philosopher has firstly to 
clear the ground, secondly, to tell others what to do in education, now that the ground 
has been cleared, and thirdly explain to newcomers to philosophy of education how 
that under-labouring had been achieved. In contrast, Hogan and Smith take the view 
that philosophy should be seen as a process of doubt and openness. So dialogue must 
be encouraged in the classroom for educators and would be philosophers of education 
(insofar as there is a distinction) in order for the class as a whole to re-think and re-
fashion their ideas. They use the example of a class in initial teacher education 
discussing moral education to show how it can become a process of open-ended 
inquiry, using Socratic dialogue, in order to clarify an important practical question.  
 
3b.  Policy  
For policy, as for pedagogy, it is relatively easy to find published material on how 
philosophy should influence policy.  But there is little on how that is done and even 
less on how that fits with the philosophical views behind it. So in what follows, again 
I turn to personal accounts, this time drawing more on interviews than on biography. 
Recent research on how social science research, including theoretical research, can 
influence policy indicates that it does so in a way which leaves space for philosophy 
(Nutley, Walter and Davies, 2007).  Most often, policies emerge piecemeal and by 





Naturally, the opportunities for dialogue that present themselves vary with country, as 
well as with the philosophical commitments of individual philosophers of education. 
In Malta, Kenneth Wain described how he experienced being part of a high profile 
policy making team. He reported the experience as being both difficult and 
worthwhile, He pointed out that when he participated in governmental policy 
discussions, he could not go public with his critique when he disagreed with the 
outcome. However he does not regret the participation. He is pleased that he had 
some influence ‘even though I did not get my way all the time’.  (Wain, 
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conversational interview, April 2009). On the other hand, the balance is only worth it 
for some policies. More recently he has relished providing critique through the media:  
A few months ago at a business breakfast with the Press, there was a 
presentation about the state of State schools. The prime minister said, ‘Any 
comments?’ I took the mike and lambasted him. Next thing it was on the 
News. What I said was in editorials. ... I was invited on the most popular 
programme, with a panel of experts, and the public. The Education Division 
and the Minister were there. It becomes more effective. People are talking 
about it. (Wain, conversational interview, April 2009) 
Bas Levering in the Netherlands also uses the media as a means of influence: 
Yes. When there is big news for instance from the minister making a 
statement, they come to me. I talk a lot and they [the reporters] make their 
own stories. I have no problem with this. I demand to see it before it goes out 
and sometimes I re-write it… I am the person in Utrecht who is almost always 
asked. I am a philosopher: I can do three sentences. They phone saying there 
is a new problem and I say it is not a new problem because I know some 
history. Colleagues refuse saying there is no research yet. When the media ask 
me I say I’ll know tomorrow. This is philosophy of education. There is always 
an opportunity. Another way of looking at the same thing. That’s a very nice 
thing: some opportunity to say something short and direct. I use my 
experience as a teacher and a politician. (Levering, conversational interview, 
April 2009) 
While he is not a member of any policy team, the media exposure has meant that he is 
often asked to advise on government policy. 
 
Probably the most common way of trying to influence policy is through membership 
of a research team. Richard Pring is an example. Most recently he has headed the six 
year Nuffield Review of 14-19 education. He describes how it may have influenced 
policy.  
We produced a report.  The difficulty with reports is they get published, you 
get a bit of notice in the newspapers, and then they sit on shelves.  And so I 
don’t think just producing books is really going to influence anybody very 
much.  We produced a synopsis with our recommendations and made sure that 
it got very wide circulation. ... You have to produce the argument but then you 
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have to give a good synopsis. ... You are influencing people in different sorts 
of ways. ... We had several seminars with civil servants. ... Certainly getting to 
know the civil servants gave us access to the ministers. ... I’ve given evidence 
to three select committees. ... So in a way it’s getting to know civil servants, 
key people, politicians and so on.  (Pring, conversational interview, November 
2010) 
In a similar vein, Pring describes the significance of having conversations with key 
people when the opportunity presents.  For instance he has had a series of discussions 
with senior politicians and policy makers visiting Oxford University. He describes 
how over the soup at one dinner, Keith Joseph, then the Minister of Education: 
waved his finger at me and said, ‘You’ve caused all the problems in our 
schools.’  I said, ‘Why, what have I done to deserve this?’  He said, ‘Because 
you introduced teachers to John Dewey.’ And we had a conversation about it. 
Keith Joseph was a really fascinating person because he believed in arguments 
and discussion. (Pring, conversational interview, November 2010) 
 
It is arguable that these three philosophers have a view of influence which can be seen 
to be congruent with their philosophical positions. Wain particularly emphasises 
critique and that both education and philosophy are embedded in community, as he 
does in his philosophical writing. Levering’s work shows him to favour 
phenomenological and conceptual methods in order to come to some objective 
understandings. This fits well with his willingness not only to provide brief statements 
for the media but also to engage in argument about them. Pring discusses the issue 
directly:  
Raising these questions about the aims of education, the broader aims and not 
having those aims impoverished by a very narrow view of academic learning, 
is one of our main messages.  I think another one is in that wider vision of 
learning, coming from those wider aims, we emphasise the importance of 
practical intelligence and so on. ... I think it’s a lot to do with philosophy in so 
far as we do put forward an argument. (Pring, conversational interview, 
November 2010) 
 
4. Nowadays.       
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This paper has presented some differing views about what it is to live an educational, 
philosophical life as a philosopher and as a philosopher of education. These accounts are 
all, necessarily, describing the past, sometimes the recent past. In the rest of the paper I 
consider whether such approaches are still relevant, given how fast the world of Higher 
Education is changing. This is not just a local question. In our globalised world of fast 
communication, educational policy travels nationally, regionally in Europe, and globally.   
 
Global educational policy has been tending towards centralised policy initiatives, often 
designed to put learning and any associated teaching directly in the service of the 
government, very often in relation to the national economy. Within the European Union 
(EU), and then more widely in Europe, this instrumental perspective informs the Lisbon 
strategy which was adopted in 2000. It was intended to deal with a perceived failure of 
economic growth in the EU. It called for the development of various policy initiatives, 
including within education. Following this, the European Commission called for the 
‘modernisation of universities’ which it says is ‘a core condition for the success of the 
Lisbon strategy’ and ‘part of the wider move towards an increasingly global and 
knowledge-based economy’ (Commission of the European Communities 2006, p.2).  In 
short, EU policy advocates a view of education - or to use the preferred terminology, ‘life-
long learning’ - as being mainly instrumental: useful for the economy and for advancing 
government interests. It may be worthwhile to point up the terminology used here. The 
policies avoid using the term ‘education’ so perhaps notice has been taken that it has not 
often been conceptualised so narrowly (Wain, 2007, p.46). The EU’s re-conceptualisation 
has been powerful (Boulton and Lucas, 2008; Delauré, 2010; Geschwind and Larsson, 
2008; Maasen, 2000). As Maasen argues for Higher Education Institutions (HEIs):  
The traditional underlying idea of the European HEI as a public, 
democratically run, social institution is clashing with the instrumental vision 
of the HEI as a professionally managed, autonomous ‘enterprise’ operating in 
various markets as a service industry. (2006, p.4): 
Universities increasingly see themselves as brand labels operating in a market (e.g. 
Morgan, 2011)  
 
This service industry is expected to operate in relation to both students and research. The 
levers that governments operate to implement the policies are a mixture of government 
(through funding regimes) and governance (through a range of mechanisms, especially 
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league tables). Quite often a kind of Faustian pact is made, in which HE is given a steer 
from government but itself determines the details of benchmarks and measures, for fear of 
anything worse being imposed. These pacts operate in relation both to teaching and to 
research, and also tend to drive a wedge between these two activities. 
 
Students are conceived as learners, customers and future contributors to the economy 
through paid employment. The impact on pedagogy can be felt in Higher Education, 
through processes of standardised benchmarking, league tables of student satisfaction and 
surveys of the career destinations of recent graduates, focusing especially on paid 
employment.  For instance the Lisbon strategy has inspired the Bologna process and the 
setting up of the European Network for Quality Assurance in Higher Education  
(ENQA) which focuses mainly on teaching and learning. In the UK the body which 
assesses the quality of teaching and learning is the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA),  
 
Research is increasingly subject to policy constraints which are related to the Lisbon 
strategy and the ‘modernisation’ project. In the UK an exercise to measure research output 
by individual academics and their institutions has had a huge impact. This was called the 
Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) – and is now re-named the Research Excellence 
Framework (REF). It is intended to measure the quality of research at different 
universities. Panels of academics make judgements about a submission by an individual 
university department. They judge individual publications. They also judge whole 
submissions using criteria designed to measure research income and also research impact 
on business, industry or policy (Higher Education Funding Council for England 2009). 
These exercises have had a huge influence on how individuals and institutions carry out 
and fund research. 
 
Government has a limited but significant ability to force change. An example is provided 
by the 2010 UK Browne Report on funding in Higher Education. It has generated serious 
questions about the future of the arts and humanities in British universities (Collini, 2010). 
Governance has proved even more effective. Standardised quality criteria for teaching and 
research are used to construct league tables and universities are keen to be seen near the 
top of national and international league tables. That said, not surprisingly, since there is a 
plethora of available tables on the web, each institution strives to spin such information to 
its own advantage.  
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4. Does a kind of hemlock beckon?  
I now return to the question which was posed at the start of the paper:  How far and in what 
ways it is possible to live a philosophical, educational life, nowadays? It may be that it is 
possible only for some conceptions of education and only for some resolutions to the 
tensions of philosophy. Both teaching and research are expected to serve the needs of the 
government and economy, as perceived by government and employers. The pedagogy that 
is recommended is one that focuses on clear, measurable objectives and outcomes, which 
include transferable ‘graduate skills’ and which are specified in advance.  Students are 
asked to evaluate a course in terms of whether these specifications have been met. 
Outcomes such as ‘thinking more deeply’, or which are ‘to be determined in discussion 
with the class’ are not acceptable. Equally, research outcomes are expected to be 
measurable. In the UK, they are assessed in relation to their influence (‘impact’) other than 
through scholarship and teaching. They also contribute to the reputation of a university, 
improving its ability to attract fee-paying students. These approaches do not encourage 
philosophers like Socrates or Plato who were critical, and tolerant of open-ended 
arguments. It is difficult to imagine either of them producing bullet-pointed lists of 
objectives for QAA or executive summaries of their investigations, suitable for REF-able 
proof of impact on policy.  Indeed while both of them were keen to influence policy, their 
success rating must be rated as low in the time-scale allowed by government. Socrates was 
put to death, and Plato was sold into slavery. While such fates do not threaten present day 
philosophers of education, contemporary policies of education do not encourage a critical, 
open-ended, provisional approach to pedagogical practices or dialogues with policy 
makers. Nor do approaches that do not produce material in forms suitable for busy policy 
makers. There are few philosophers of education who can work whole-heartedly within 
these constraints. 
 
I began the article with the Apology but my question is focused on current dilemmas in 
Europe (and similar areas of the world). I am not considering the situation in those parts of 
the world which more closely resemble the troubled city of ancient Athens, enduring the 
effects of military defeat, devastated by civil war and decimated by disease (Hughes, 
2010). My question is addressed to philosophers of education of all ages (as perhaps it 
might have posed itself to Socrates if he had been younger, and perhaps posed itself to 
Plato, his student). Socrates was old at the time of the trial, as he himself remarks, and 
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nowadays too, age matters. The dilemma is sharper for those near the start of their lives 
and careers, who have not had the experience of different ways of being academics, and 
who are still severely subject to institutional constraints.  
 
The examples I have given show that space for wholeheartedly living a philosophical, 
educational life is under threat. It has become a life that requires being somewhat 
subversive and, perhaps, not daring to speak its name. Space may be created in 
Departments of Education because it is common for a philosopher of education to have 
knowledge in areas other than philosophy. It is this that may give her room to teach or to 
influence policy. Practical issues in education always include philosophical ones. 
Educational research is often done in teams. Individuals speak as both educators and 
philosophers, whether or not they claim to be one or the other. As Wain puts it: 
I can’t detach myself from being a philosopher. I bring all my baggage with me to bear 
on any educational question. (Conversational interview, April 2009) 
 
However, philosophising on the quiet is not easy because of requirements for specific 
forms of educational research, for performance indicators in teaching and for evidence of 
impact on policy and on ‘users’ outside the academy all of which take up the time. And 
doubts and uncertainties take time if they are to be raised and discussed in class or in 
research teams. It takes time to understand what other perspectives philosophers have 
brought to the issues. And it takes time to work out how to work with performance or 
quality indicators which are designed for quite a different way of living.  It is all too easy 
for the busy work of academic life nowadays to erode and corrode a philosophical, 
educational life and mould it into something else altogether.  
 
My argument shows that opportunities to live a philosophical life depend on the context. 
They also depend on the creativity of individual philosophers to see and seize their 
chances. Individuals may be able to continue to find ways of introducing their 
philosophical understanding into their professional practice. At the same time, being 
creative depends on there being time and space to think deeply and discuss arguments with 
peers, through conferences, seminars and Journal articles.  Fortunately, even a 
‘modernised’ university has some reason to support such activities owing to its wish to 
improve its market position through its academic reputation.  However there is always a 
considerable danger that when somebody lives with, but tries to subvert, a hostile 
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environment, that she deceives herself about who and what she becomes. It is possible to 
live an educational, philosophical life but it must mean expending considerable energy 
producing smoke screens behind which to do it, and a vigilant reflexivity about the shape 
that the life has become. 
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1
 A Socrates of Athens gave this speech, but its content was not recorded directly at the time. In this 
paper I am discussing the Socrates reported by Plato rather than in the only other surviving account by 
Xenephon .  
2
 I am taking it that this is more a Platonic rather than Socratic view, since it comes from the 
Theaetetus, which is usually agreed to be one of the later dialogues. 
3
 Educational practice is full of tensions that need to be resolved in context and always provisionally.  
Berlak and Berlak (1981) remains an exemplary example of such an approach to understanding school 
teaching.  
4 Though springing from life, as I understand it – see Arendt (1961). 
5
 I say more about policy in Griffiths (2012) 
